

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Follow-up on President's Speech
of April 16, 1953

1. General

It would be unwise at this time to engage in

a) a series of public statements expanding in detail the points of the President's speech or a fulsome rebuttal of the Soviet Pravda article. Our Embassy at Moscow recommends, and the Department generally concurs, in the view that on the initial exchange we have emerged not only as the winner but have left the Soviet leadership confused and hampered. This favorable development should be allowed to run its course without presenting the Soviets with any opportunity for getting off the hook, which might happen if a propaganda battle were to be conducted.

b) Armistice negotiations in Korea continue at a climactic stage. It would be unwise to prejudice the success of these negotiations or the future of the projected subsequent political conference by engaging in a free-swinging debate at this time.

c) A new complication has been introduced by Prime Minister Churchill's proposals for a Great Power Conference. Obviously, a political warfare follow-up will have to incorporate among its major themes whatever courses of

action

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

-2-

action may grow out of a United States decision with respect to the Churchill proposals.

2. Defense Proposals (PSB-40; draft of March 8, 1953)

All of the above developments have occurred since the death of Stalin and could only to a very limited extent be anticipated in the directives for political warfare and formation of WGS. Similarly, the Soviet "peace offensive" and the Korean Armistice negotiations have become more important factors than may have been anticipated when the original paper was written. A different strategy is now indicated. WGS has to some extent adjusted its basic terms of reference (PSB-40) to the new situation. However, I believe that some of the measures originally suggested by Defense () and which it is now proposed to execute, would be out of tune with the present situation.

a) The President's speech probably achieved its greatest effect in offering a vision of peace. Even at the time it was made, it would have been inappropriate to follow it with a series of sabre-rattling gestures such as extensive fleet visits, army maneuvers in sensitive areas, publicity for U.S. armed forces build-ups, etc. Moreover, these measures were proposed before the cuts in U.S. foreign aid and the military budget were proposed.

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

-3-

b) It would appear inconsistent to make a series of warlike gestures at the very time when we are "cutting out the fat" in the military establishment and accepting a "stretch-out" in European rearmament. Our gestures would be suspect if not exposed. The tone would be in jarring contradiction with that of the President's speech. Such actions as these might have been appropriate to a situation in which the Soviet Union was rudderless after Stalin's death and might have been frightened into changing its attitude, but this policy now seems out of date.

c) A number of other proposed actions (especially under "3. Operations involving United Nations actions in Korea" depend upon decisions with respect to United States foreign policy, particularly in the Far East, and upon the outcome of the current negotiations. If there is no armistice in Korea, and if the United States decides to proceed to more active military measures, then the actions proposed in the referenced paper would logically follow, not as mere gestures, but as political warfare supplements to an over-all military plan.

d) The subject of a general Volunteer Freedom Corps drawn from around the world is under consideration by another interdepartmental group which will make recommendations relating this project to general defense and policy considerations.

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

-4-

e) The paper in reference makes other proposals of a more pacific character (pp. 23 and 24) including Soviet-USA cooperation in building a World War II monument; increased participation of USSR in specialized agencies of the United Nations, etc. With respect to these, we must ask ourselves whether it is to our interest to create a greater impression of détente than actually exists; for example, the erection of a World War II monument in Berlin, on which occasion USSR and Western troops would fraternize, is not likely to steel the will of the inhabitants of Berlin.

f) The proposal to send Nehru to negotiate in China would not at this time be approved by the State Department for a number of reasons.

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

-5-

3. On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the following suggestions as to a feasible and effective "follow up" are advanced:

a) "Deeds, not words." (1) The United States is moving ahead on the Austrian Peace Treaty and will shortly make concrete proposals in this respect; (2) The Department of State has instructed its representatives in Bonn, Paris, Rome and Tokyo to suggest to the Governments concerned that they make strong public reference on appropriate occasions to the President's proposal for the release of Russian-held POW's from the last war as a test of Soviet intentions.

b) The Pravda article presents rebuttal opportunities for the appropriate time; for example, the treatment of the disarmament question and its cavalier and incorrect reference to the Marshall Plan. The Department and WGS should cooperate in organizing rebuttal material and arranging for speeches by appropriate persons at the right time. (For example, Messrs. McCloy and Kennan have been suggested.)

c) When the U.S. attitude on the Churchill proposal is clear and especially if any conference is convened, a Presidential speech or an address by the Secretary could sum up developments from April 16 to that time.

d) USDEL

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

-6-

d) USDEL might work for the return of the USSR to UNESCO, WHO and FAO; or at least point out that Soviet absence from these is inconsistent with professed Soviet desire to listen to reason on important matters.

e) The U.S. could officially propose that the U.S. and the Soviet bloc relax restrictions on the travel of diplomatic personnel.

f) The United States may wish (subject to availability of funds) to suggest reopening of USIS facilities in the satellite countries.

g) World Development. The World Development Fund proposed in the President's speech can be further discussed. The promise inherent in the speech may seem belied by our action in the United Nations on the International Development Fund. Mr. Lodge should deal with this problem by some sort of statement, perhaps emphasizing what we have done in the past in economic aid.

h) A World Religious Conference in Europe (as proposed by Defense) may be considered. (This could boomerang if the political warfare motive appears too visibly behind the religious motive.)

i) The programs for defection of Communist officials and public can be continued, and oriented to purposes of the present campaign.

j) The

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

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-7-

j) The enormous mass of popular and official response to the President's speech throughout the world furnishes media with a backlog for exploitation as does the commentary now appearing in the satellite press. It should also be combed for an indication of purely local reactions and opportunities; e.g. Pannikar, former Indian Ambassador to Communist China extravagantly praised the President's address. It might be suggested that he present these views in Indian publications.

4. To exploit all suggestions such as the above, and to coordinate policy with propaganda, there should be a focal point in each department and an interdepartmental steering group. Such a group is needed particularly in the Department of State. (Meeting is invited to consider terms of reference of WGS; its relation to PSB; question as to whether interdepartmental group should be comprised on policy level rather than propaganda level.)

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

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